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EDITORIAL COMMENT.
MEETING OF THE AJxEpICAN INSTITUTE

OF

CRITINAL

LAW

AND

CRIMINOLOGY.

The second annual meeting of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology was held in Washington September 80 and
October 1. On Friday evening of the former day, a joinit meeting
was held with the American Prison Association, at which addresses
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were delivered by Professor John H. Wigmore, President of the Institute; Albert H. Hall, Esq., of the Minn apolis Bar; Judge Charles
A. De Courcy, of Massachusetts, and Governor A. W. Gilchrist, of
Florida. On Saturday two sessions were held. At the morning
session an address of welcome was delivered by. Judge W. H. DeLacy of Washington, and at the same session the presidential address of Mr. Wigmore was read. On Saturday evening a banquet was held at the New Willard Hotel, at which the principal address was delivered by Attorney General Wickersham. Mr. Wickersham dwelt upon some of the defects "in our methods of criminal
procedure and arraigned the system for the weight which it attgches
to technicalities. Comparing English and American methods and referring to the part which the English judge plays in the trial, Mr.
Wickersham said:
*
"The judges in England are enabled to exercise control because
of the position of power and respect they command in the community, in the first place, and because they are masters of English
law and procedure. This last named qualification, I regret to say,
does not always apply to the American criminal judiciary.
"If an able lawyer gets on the bench by mistake, we congratulate ourselves on our good fortune, and we hope that he will be continued there. In the case of an English judge, the whole position of.
domination is animated purely by the desire for justice, as he considers it to be.
"Such direction is shocking to the American mind, but it is
equally shocking for us to see a man, who every one knows is an
infernal scoundrel, hoodwinking justice and finally obtaining acquittal, after four or five trials, when every one knows he shot down the
man in cold blood.
"Multiplicity of appeals, made possible by American crimin.al
procedure, is undoubtedly the cause of much miscarriage of justice,
and the escape of many criminals."
"Mr. Taft," he said, "after his long experience on-the bench,
has shown that the Republic pays exorbitant bills for guaranteeing
that the technicalities shall not be violated.
"It is most desirable that out of the deliberations of such bodies
as the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology recommendations for the improvement of criminal procedure, which would
result in remedial legislation, should develop."
In his presidential address Mr. Wigmore reviewed the work of
.the Institute during the past year, and outlined the plans for the
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ensuing year. "Many important workers," he said, "hitherto isolated have been found out and brought into touch. All workers have
been encouraged by the consciousness of cobperation. The efficiency
of all the labors has been multiplied. Wasteful and misdirected efforts have been prevented.. Public interest and confidence have been
confirmed and stimulated. Without organization these things must
have lingered and failed.
"The local organization needed for influencing state law and
practice has also been stimulated. 'A state conference has been
held in Wisconsin, and one is to be held in the near future in Kansas.
During the first year of our existence this feature has not been
emphasized as it may be in the future. But, for this purpose, strong
men must arise in each state who will lead the work.' The states of
Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois and Missouri have a special duty
in this respect, and that duty has not yet been realized. Tangible results have been reached or hastened in the specific problems of our
field. Nine working committees were appointed, including over
seventy workers. Of these nine, seven have reported. Of these
seven the work of one stands complete, the committee on the establishment of a Journal."
The committee on Translation of European Treatises has also
done much of its work. The resolution of the Institute calling for
the appointment of this committee recognizes that "it is exceedingly
desirable that important treatises on criminology in foreign languages be made readily accessible in the English langauge." President Wigmore says of this committee that it "has let the contracts
for translating nine most representative works. These will bring
our whole thinking public into touch with the best European results
of theory and practice. Two of these works are almost off the press,
and others are actually in course of translation." The committee
reports that "it realizes the necessity of educating the professions
and the public by the wide diffusion of information on the subject ;"
that "the legal profession in particular has a duty to familiarize itself
with the principles of that science as the sole means for intelligent and
systematic improvement of the criminal law ;" and that "one of its
('the Institute') principal modes of stimulating and aiding this study
(of modern criminal science) is to make available in the English language the most useful treatises ndw extant in the continental languages."
The works now being published are "Criminal Psychology," by
Hans Gross; "Modern Theories of Criminology," by Bernaldo de
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Quiros; "Criminal Sociology," by Enrico Ferri; "Individualization
of Punishment," by Raymond Saleilles; "Crime, Its Causes and
Remedies," by. Cesare Lombroso; "Penal Philosophy," by Gabriel
Tarde; "Criminality and Economic Conditions," by W. A. Bonger;
"Criminology," by Raffaelle Garofalo, 4nd "Crime and Its Repression," by Gustav Aschaffenburg. This series will be published by
Messrs.-Little, Brown & Company, Boston.
The committee on System of Recording Data of Criminality had
for its subject the "investigation of an effective system for recording
the phisical and moral status and the hereditary and environmental
condition of delinquents, and, in particular, of the persistent offender; the same to contemplate in complex urban conditions, the
use of consultifig experts in the contributory sciences." The system
reported by this committee comprises for the most part the schedules
used by Dr. William Healy in the Juvenile Psychopathic Clinic of
Chicago. These schedules are being uscd by the judges in a number of courts, both juvenile and municipal, in different sections of the
country.
Other important topics worked upon during the year and reported at the last conference are, "Organization of Courts," "Criminal Procedure" and "Criminal and Judicial Statistics."
All of these committees are to continue their investigations of
the subjects assigned them last year, and to report again at the
next conference.
The, Institute authorized the appointment of committees to
study during the coming year the following additional topics: "An
investigation of the insane offender, with a view first to ascertain
how the existing legal rules of criminal responsibility can be adjusted to the, conclusions of modern medical science and modern penal
science, and, secondly, to devise such amendments in the mode of legal
proceedings as will best realize these principles and avoid current
abuses," and "The alien and the courts with a special reference to the
following questions: treaty rights; status under the various state
laws; procedure including interpreters, appeals, etc.; deportation for
commission of crime; and criminal statistics as affected by legal disabilities."
The Institute also voted that its executive board should have
power to accept an invitation on behalf of the International Criminalistic Union to become the recognized unit of that association in this
country, and steps to that end were taken.
A report which attracted special attention was that presented
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by the committee appointed last spring to visit England and make
an investigation of English methods of criminal procedure. In
presenting this report, Dean Lawson spoke of the organization of
the English Judiciary and of the dispatch with which juries are selected, cases tried and appeals disposed of. Mr. Lawson stated that
he had spent three months attending the courts of London and
another month on the circuit, and that as a result of his observations
he was convinced that we were a century behind England as regards
our methods of criminal procedure.
"I have sat with the Court on various benches throughout England," he said, "and have traveled with the Circuit Courts and Court
of Appeals, and learned much of their practice and the expeditious
way in which they dispose of the legal business that comes before the
English courts. That experience is sufficient to convince one conversant with American methods of the imperative necessity for reform in the administration of justice in this country.
"In England every man gets absolute justice and fair play,
but the courts there will not tolerate delay. It is rare that a juror is
challenged. Opposing lawyers get together before cases are called,
agree upon the venire, and make every arrangement possible to
assist the court and obtain an early trial. American practices leading to interminable delays and repeated postponements of cases are
not known, and would not be permitted if attempted. On one day
I recall the Court of Appeals made more than fifteen decisions in addition to attending to motions and other routine business that came
before the court. After the lawyers had concluded their arguments
the judges held a short consultation, authorized one of their number
to give the opinion of the court, and it was done instantly. I marveled
at this, and asked why decision was given in this way. The judges
of the English court saw nothing unusual in such practice. 'These
people are before us for a judgment,' one member of the court replied. 'We have heard the argument and know the law, so why not
iender our opinion immediately.'
"That is the reason the English courts are not congested like
ours, and it is this policy that makes British justice speedy and sure.
Reversing a judgment is a rarity, and cases never hang fire as they
do with us. The system is much more advanced than ours, and their
practice includes many of the reforms that President Taft has advocated and which inevitably must be adopted in the United States."
Only a few minutes were required, he said, to select a jury, and
after the arguments were concluded the verdict was usu. lly returned
519
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by the jury before leaving the box. In one case which he saw tried
the verdict was reached in three minutes after the judge had given
the instructions. In another case the jury retired, but was out only
five minutes. When appeals are taken but a short time elapses before they are heard, and they are disposed of with marvelous celerity.
In one day, he said, the new Court of Criminal Appeal actually disposed of fifteen cases, and on July 12, when it rose, it had disposed
of every case on its docket. We publish in this number of the
Journal the first installment of this report, and"the second part will
appear in the January number. It represents the results of a very
careful .investigation of English methods of procedure, gained'not
from books but from actual observation of the workings of the courts
themselves, and is, we believe, a fair and accurate presentation of
the facts.
All of the reports referred to above, except the second part of
the last mentioned one, have now been published in the Journal.
Taken altogether, these reports make, in our opinion, a substantial
contribution to the literature of criminal law and criminology, and
represent a well conceived and effectively executed year's work by
the Institute. If each succeeding year's contribution to the cause
of a better and more scientific criminal law should approach in quantity and quality that of the first year, the existence of the Institute
•will have been abundantly justified.
o
The organization of the Institute for the ensuing year was affected by the election of the following officers:
President-Nathan William MacChesney, of Chicago, former
vice-president of the Illinois Bar Association, and Commissioner on
Uniform Laws.
First Vice-President-William H. DeLacy, of Washington,
D. C., Judge of the Juvenile Court.
Second Vice-President-Edward T. Devine, of New York City,
Professor of Social Economics in Columbia University, and Secretary
of the Charity Organization Society.
Third Vice-President-John D. Lawson, of Columbia, Missouri,
Dean of the law school of Missouri University.
Fourth Vice-President--Adolf Meyer, of Baltimore, Maryland,
Professor of Psychiatry in Johns-Hopkins University.
Fifth Vice-President-Charles F. Amidon, Judge of the United
States Court for the District of North Dakota.
Treasurer-Bronson Winthrop, New York City, member of the
New York Bar.
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Secretary-Harry E. Smoot, Chicago, Attorney for the Juvenile Protective Association.
Executive Board-Amos Butler, of Indianapolis, Ex-President of
the American Prison Association; Frederic B. Crossley, of Chicago,
Librarian of the Gary Library of Criminal Law and Criminology;
Charles A. Ellwood, of Columbia, Missouri, Professor of Sociology
in the University of Missouri; Eugene A. Gilmore, of Madison, Wisconsin, Professor of Law in Wisconsin University; Harry Olson, of
Chicago, Chief Justice of the Municipal Court; Arthur W. Towne,
of Albany, New York, Secretary ,of the State Probation Commission; John H. Wigmore, of Chicago, Professor of Law in Northwestern University; William Healy, of Chicago, Director of the
Juvenile Psychopathic Institute; Roscoe Pound, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, Professor of Law in Harvard University; Frederick W.
Lehmann, of St. Louis, Ex-President of the American Bar Association.
The Institute, through its committees, will do special work during the coining year on seven different topics, the precise wording
of which can be found by consulting the bulletins of the Institute
or its Journal. These topics embrace the different phases of the advanced work now being done by the scientific men in criminal law,
criminology, penology, psychiatry, psychology and other contributory sciences.
J. W. G.
JUDGE HOLT ON UNPUxNISHED

CRIME.

It is an encouraging sign when judges take note of the inefficiency of our criminal law and criminal courts to deal with the problem of crime in our present society; yet it would be well for such
judges to be informed upon developments in the fields of criminal
sociology and penology, if they would avoid making serious
blunders. This point is illustrated by the address of United States
District Judge George C. Holt, of New York, before the Wisconsin
State Bar Association on June 29th.
Judge Holt very properly called attention to the enormous
amount of unpunished crime in this country, and the relative inefficiency of our criminal law and criminal courts in dealing with the
problem. He estimated that there were one hundred thousand men
living in the United States who had participated in lynching riots,
unpunished for their crimes, and over one hundred and fifty thousand
who had participated in strike riots, where murder and injury to
person and property had been done, who had gone unpunished.
Besides these there are in our large cities an enormous number of
521
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murders, maimings, burglaries, highway robberies, and the like
which go unpunished. Judge Holt rightly insisted that the great
amount of unpunished crime in this country has become a menace to
our free institutions, and even to our civilization. Rightly, also,
he called attention to the faults of our courts as in part responsible
for this large amount of unpunished crime. He spoke especially of
the inexcusable delays in the administration of justice, the admission of irrelevant testimony, the latitude allowed experts in criminal
trials, and the multiplicity of indictments as things which should be
corrected in our criminal courts.
Very properly, also, he admitted that punishment alone could
never solve the problem of crime, that crime could only be gotten rid
of by getting-rid of the criminal. At this point, however, he made
the mistake of suggesting that habitual criminals should be put to
death. It is exceedingly regrettable that this one slip in Judge
Holt's speech should have been magnified by the sensational press
into the principal thing in his address. This, of course, was a grave
injustice to Judge Holt; nevertheless, he should have known that
penologists everywhere have come to the conclusion that the segregation of habitual criminals will answer all purposes of the death
penalty, and avoid the many objections which may be rightly
urged against the death penalty for every form of crime except that
of murder. It must be admitted that the death penalty is of use
in the solution of the problem of crime only in a relatively low moral
state of society. It is at best a concession to the low moral status
of the masses, for there is not much use in abolishing the death
penalty for murder as long as the mass of the people show their
thirst for blood by lynchings. The proposition, howevr, to reestablish the death penalty for offenses less heinous than murder is
a backward step, unwarranted by either the state of society, or the
nature of the problem of crime, and it is to be regretted that such
a proposition was advocated in an otherwise excellent address.
C. A. E.
JUDICIAL DISREGARD OF TECIINICALITIES.

It is refreshing to observe the changing attitude of the courts
toward technicalities in judicial procedure. The signs indicate that
the widespread criticism to which some of them have been justly
subjected for sacrificing justice to technicality and substance to form
is beginning to produce results.
In the May number of the Journal we commented on a notable
opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Caplrs v. State, 104
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Pac. 493, 1909) which refused to grant a new trial for the omission
of a useless word in an indictment, and which at the same time took
occasion to say that it purposed to give the people of the state a
"just and harmonious system of criminal jurisprudence, founded on
justice and supported by reason, freed from the mysticism of arbitrary technicalities."
"This standard," the Court added, "will control our decisions, it matters not what or how many other appellate
courts may have decided to the contrary." "Now that our criminal
jurisprudence," it went on to say, "is in its formative period, we are
determined to do all in our power to place it upon the broad and
sure foundation of reason and justice so that the innocent may find
it to be a refuge of defense and protection, and that the guilty may
be convicted and taught that it is an exceedingly serious and dangerous thing to violate the laws of this state, whether they be rich
and influential or poor and friendless. : : -a
If we place ou.
criminal jurisprudence upon a technical basis it will become the
luxury of the rich who can always hire able and skillful lawyers to
invoke technicalities in their behalf. We will give full consideration
to all authorities which are supported by living principles, and will
follow them when in harmony with our laws and the conditions existing in Oklahoma. But we must confess to a want of respect for precedents which were found in the rubbish of Noah's Ark, and which
have outlived their usefulness, if they ever had any." All honor to
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for this enlightened and progressive
stand, and we wish the words in which its opinion is thus announced
could be burned into the mind of every appellate judge in the land.
It is impossible for a layman to understand why this rule should not
be the guiding principle of every judge who thinks more of substance than' of form, and who desires to exalt justice above technicality.
We are glad to be able to call attention in this connection to a
somewhat similar stand recently taken by the -Court of Appeals of
New York, whose code of criminal procedure declares that in capital
cases the appellate court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or defects, or to'exceptions which do not effect the substantial rights of the parties. In the case of the People v. Gilbert
(109 N. Y. 10) the defendant had been convicted of murder, and his
guilt was established beyond a doubt, but his counsel sought a reversal on the ground that the indictment neglected to state that the
victim was a "human being"--an omission which it was contended
was prejudicial to the rights of the accused. But such hair splitting
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logic did not impress the Court of Appeals, and it made short work
of the petition. In overruling the objection, Judge Vann took occasion to express his opinion of the place of technicalities in judicial
procedure, and to say that the criminal law was fast outgrowing
the subtle refinements which had been devised for the protection of
innocent persons in an age when the severity of the criminal code was
such as to shock the moral sense of all right minded men.
"Technical objections are no longer regarded as serious," said
Judge Vann, "unless they are so thoroughly supported by authority
that 'they cannot well be disregarded, even under the latitude of the
statute relating to the subject. The criminal law is fast outgrowing
those technicalities which grew up when the punishment for crime
was so severe, as in many cases, to shock the moral sense of lawyers,
judges and the public generally. When stealing a handkerchief
worth one shilling was punished by death and there were nearly 200
different capital offenses, it was to the credit of humanity that technicalities should be invoked in order to prevent the cruelty of a strict
and literal enforcement of the law. Those times have passed, for
the criminal law is no longer harsh or inhumane, and it is fortunate
for the safety of life and property that technicalities, to a great extent, have lost their hold."
Commenting on this decision the Springfield (Mass.) Republican observes that one can only marvel that so absurd a technicality
as the above should ever have been able to get a hearing in any
American court, much less a judgment of this statement and weight.
To the shame of our technical-ridden system, however, there are many
jurisdictions in which such technicalities are still respected and made
use of to delay or defeat justice. We have called attention in previous numbers of this Journal to some of the more flagrant instances
in which this has happened, and will doubtless have occasion to do so
again in the future. The attitude of the New York Court of Appeals is thoroughly in accord with common sense and reason, and
will meet the approval of all laymen as well as all members of !he
bar who have the proper sense of their obligations to society. If all
courts would dispose of technicalities in this way much of the present
widespread dissatisfaction with the administration of the criminal
law would disappear. That an appellate court should render judgment upon the merits of the case without regard to technical errors
which do not substantially prejudice the rights of the accused is as
self-evident to a layman as the mathematical fact -that five and five
make ten. "What would you think of a Supreme Court," asks the
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Philadelphia Star, "that set aside a ball game where the score was
99 to 1 and required it to be played over again simply because the
umpire made a mistake in his decision thai affected one run? It
might be clear that the game had been won on the merits and that
the umpire's decision had not affected the result, and yet because
he made one error the game would have to be played all over again."
And yet, as the Star adds, the Supreme Courts of many of our
states are proceeding along analogous lines in reviewing the decisions of trial courts. It is a source of gratification and evidence of
a coming reaction that the highest courts of Oklahoma, Wisconsin,
New York, and other states have set themselves against the old view
which often sacrificed justice to technicality, and have announced
their determination to administer justice on the basis of reason and
J.W.G.
common sense.
JUDICIAL SUPPORT op TECHNICALITIES.

The attitude of the New York Court of Appeals in the case referred to above is in refreshing contrast with that taken by the
Supreme Court of Alabama in the recent case of the state against
West, where a conviction for stealing hides was set aside because the
indictment failed to state whether the aforesaid articles were mule,
goat, cow, or sheep hides. The constitution of Alabama declares
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation, and in the judgment
of the learned tribunal which was called upon to review the record
of the trial court in this case, the thief, whose guilt had been established beyond all doubt and who had been sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of six years, had a constitutional right to more
specific information concerning the kind of skins stolen in order that
he might the better prepare to meet the charge against him. To an
intelligent lay mind this is the veriest quibbling; it is simply trifling
with justice, and it is such farcical performances as this that are
doing so much to heap ridicule upon the legal profession and to
bring our methods of judicial procedure into disrepute. Nevertheless, a writer in the Chicago Legal News undertakes to defend the
Alabama Supreme Court from the charge of sacrificing justice to
technicality. Indeed, he boldly asserts that this is not a technicality
but a fundamental principle of the constitution and the law. "Now
it must be apparent," he says, "that the mere charge of -stealing
some hides, without more, is simply equivalent to saying that West
was guilty of stealing. It would obviously be as impossible for West

JUDICIAL SUPPORT OF TECHNICALITIES.

in the instant case safely to go into the trial, unless the kind of hides
stolen were mentioned in the indictment as it would had the charge
been the general one of stealing animals without mentioning whether
they were mules, goats, cows, or sheep, and the state were permitted
on the trial to prove that the defendant stole a lot of animals. There
is no difference between the two cases. In either case he would be
wholly unprepared to meet the vague and ambiguous charge."
Again: "In order to properly instruct the jury, the indictment
must inform the court of the kind of hides the defendant is charged
with stealing. Inasmuch, however, as the circuit judge in Alabama
did not know the indictment was bad on its face, he doubtless experi" enced no difficulty in instructing the jury on the simple question of
stealing hides; that and nothing more, and so, the jury found a verdict against the defendant for stealing hides. Now, if West should
be prosecuted again on the same charge of stealing hides, he could
again and again be convicted, as his plea in bar could only mention
hides and he could rely on the face of the indictment alone, and
would not be permitted to eke out the cfAarge in the previous indictment by parol, showing that the hides were, the .same in the latter
as in the former prosecution. And thus one of the main safeguards
which the prosecution throws around the accused, whether he be innocent or whether he be guilty, would be broken down."
This brand of argument strikes the layman very much like the
logic of the Duchess in Alice, in Wonderland where she says: "Never
imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might appear to
others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than
what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise."
Our advocate of this kind of "criminal" justice informs us that
it has been determined in Missouri that an indictment which charges
one with shooting at a mark on a public highway is defective unless
it designates by. name the particular highway (31 Mo. 349), and,
he adds, "The various court reports are full of just such rulings."
We regret to say that the last statement, to the shame of the law,
is all too true. We commented in a'previous number of this Journal
on a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri (State v.
Campbell, 109 S.W. Reporter, p. 706) in which the conviction of a
man for a dastardly crime was set aside because the article "the"
was omitted from the indictment, thus indicating, as Samuel Scoville
has remarked, that in Missouri the definite article "the" is of more
importance than a man's honor or a woman's chastity. And this
ruling was made in the face of a Missouri statute which declares
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"that no indictment shall be deemed invalid for any fault or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights
of the defendant upon the merits."
We rejoice to know, however, that there are respectable authorities in Missouri who repudiate the doctrine that the article "the"
is an essential part of an indictment, and that its omission therefrom
is a denial of due process of law. One of these is Frederick W. Lehmann of St. Louis, ex-president of the American Bar Association,
whose remarks on the subject were printed in the last number of this
Journal. "Had a mob assembled to lynch the fiend in this case,"
says M'r. Lehmann, "and I had appeared on the scene and pleaded
with them to let the law take its course they would have said, 'We
have no respect for a law which puts the definite article the in
sanctity above the chastity of our wives and daughters.' Such things
bring the law into contempt and disrepute and make you and me
ashamed of it when we are arraigned at the bar of the common
sense of mankind."
We have already called attention to the refusal of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma to grant a new tiial because of the omission
of the article "the," and the declaration of the court that it intended to do all in its power to place the jurisprudence of the state
upon the broad and sure foundation of reason and justice. "We
know," said the Court, "that there are respectable authorities holding to the contrary, but this Court will not follow any precedents
unless we know and approve the reason upon which they are basedit matters not how numerous they may be, or how eminent the court
by which they are promulgated." The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
has taken the same enlightened view in a decision involving the
validity of an indictment which omitted the useless phrase "against
the peace and dignity of the state." "This formula," said the
Court, "is a mere rhetorical flourish adding nothing to the substance
of the indictment, and of course the accused cannot possibly bhe
prejudiced or in any manner be misled by its omission from the indictment."
It is difficult to see how a court which seriously regards itselfas an instrumentality for the administration of justice can take any
other view of the matter. And yet the Supreme Court reporti of
many of our states are full of decisions overruling well-deserved convictions for the omission from the indictment of such words as "the,"
"there," "did," "and," the use of "or" instead of "and ;" the slight
misspelling of words; abbreviations, and the like. Some of the cases
527
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in which justice has been delayed or defeated through such hairsplitting refinements were recently pointed out by Charles Brewer
of the Maryland Bar in an article summarized in the September
number of this Journal.
As an example of the way in which the requirement in regard
to the choice of words in the indictment and the constitutional requirement that no one shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same
offense may be abused, Mr. Brewer cites the following case from
South Carolina:
Two pianolas had been stolen. The indictment read "two pianos." Witnesses were brought in who testified that pianolas had been stolen, and not pianos,
as charged. The indictment fell down and the accused was discharged. A
vigilant district attorney was on hand, however, and promptly had the accused
rearrested, charged with stealing two pianola s. The "shrewd" counsel defending
the accused had a new set of witnesses this time--Lexperts. The experts were
able to convince the court that, after all, pianolas and pianos were the same thing.
The court ruled that, having been tried pnce for stealing pianos, the accused could
not twice be tried for the same offense. The fact that two musical instruments
had been stolen seems to have been overlooked.
Other instances of a similar kind have been pointed out by
Samuel Scoville of the Philadelphia Bar, and in an article summarized
in the July number of this Journal. As an example of the style of
logic which finds ready acceptance in some jurisdictions, Mr. Scoville
cities a California case decided in 1904:
"An information was filed against A in which it was stated that A did unlawfully atid feloniously commit an assault upon the person of B by means likely
to produce great bodily injury- to-wit, with a heavy wooden stick. On an appeal
to the Supreme Court the latter held that this information, although following the
wording of the statute, was fatally defective because the means of injtiry were
not described with sufficient precision. A layman might very well suppose that
a heavy wooden stick could be understood as a means likely to produce great
bodily. injury; but the masterly reasoning of the Supreme Court of California
disposes of any such fallacy, as follows:
"'Describing a stick as "heavy" imparts no certain information; the term
is relative; a stick which in the hands of a boy or a feeble person would be
considered heavy, in the hands of a robust person would be deemed light. Again,
it might be heavy and yet so large and unwieldy as to be useless in the hands of
a powerful man toward the commission of an assault. It might, too, be heavy
and yet so small or short that no danger of bodily harm could reasonably be
apprehended from its iise. Aside from the use of the term "heavy" there is no
-description in the information as to the definite weight, strength or size of the
stick, or other. qualities, properties or charactdristics showing that it was a means
likely to produce great bodily injury.'
"Under this decision," observes Mr. Scoville, "it is undoubtedly the duty of
any citizen of California who expects to be assaulted-with a stick to provide himself with a tape-measure afid pocket scales, nor to forget, immediately after ihe
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assault, to obtain a complete set of the vital statistics of his assailant. Yet certain
serious contingencies suggest themselves. What should be done if the individual
wielding the stick nefariously made away with the same before any of its physical
properties could be determined? Again, the court fails to explain the victim's
duty in case the hardened owner of the stick refused to furnish any statistics as
to his size, weight or strength. The argument itself has a familiar ring, and an
examination of certain of the writings of that well-known legal authority, Mr.
Lewis Carroll, will make it apparent where this Supreme Court learrned its

logic."

The Alabama case referred to above in which the court insists
upon greater particularity in describing the offense, is not the first
contribution to the jurisprudence of technicalities delivered by this
august tribunal. In 1908 it set aside the conviction of a murderer
because the indictment, which contained the usual staggering array
of useless verbiage, did not conclude with the sacrosanct formula,
"against the peace and dignity of the state."
We cannot too strongly condemn such judicial refinements as
these. In the ordinary business transactions of our daily life they
have no place. Nowhere except in our judicial procedure do they
find a ready acceptance. In some cases they are so grotesque and
absurd as to excite well-deserved ridicule from sensible men, lawyers
and laymen alike, and more than anything else they are responsible
for the widespread popular-dissatisfaction with our present methods
of administering justice. They tend to impair confidence in the
courts, promote and foster lawlessness, diminish respect for the legal
profession, and often result in gross denials of justice to those who
J.W. G.
have a right to look to the courts for protection.
SHOULD COU TS EVER 33E CRITICIZ D For THEIR DcisioN s?

Our strictures in the preceding note upon the courts for sometimes subordinating justice to technicality through hair-splitting
logic and refinements raises the old question as to whether the judiciary should ever be criticized for its decisions. There have always
been some who fancied that judges, unlike other mortals, are infallible, and that their judicial conduct ought not to be subject to
criticism, certainly not by the laity. But the greatest English and
American judges have, themselves, repudiated any such view of the
perfection of the judicial office. The great English Lord Chancellor
Parker once said: "Let all people be at liberty to know what I
found my judgment upon; that, so when I have given it in any case,
others may be at liberty to judge of me." The propriety as well as
the value of temperate and dispassionate criticism of the decisions
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of the courts was stated with singular lucidity and.good temper in
1895 by Hoh. William H. Taft, then a circuit j.udge of the United
States:
"The opportunity freely and publicly to criticize judicial action," said Judge
Taft, "is of vastly more importance to the body politic than the immunity of
courts and judges from unjust aspersions and attack. Nothing tends more to
render judges careful in their decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact jus-tice than the consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subjected to the intelligent scrutiny and candid criticism of their fellow men. Such criticism is beneficial
in proportion as it is fair, dispassionate, discriminating and based on a knowledge
of sound legal principles. The comments made by learned text writers and by
the acute editors of the various law reviews upon judicial decisions are therefore
highly useful. Such critics constitute more or less impartial tribunals of professional opinion before which each judgment is made to stand or fall on its
merits, and-thus exert a strong influence to secure uniformity of decision. But
non-professional criticism also is by no means without its uses, even if accompanied, as it oftern is, by a direct attack upon the judicial fairness and motives of
the occupants of the bench; for if the law is but the essence of common sense, the
protest of many average men may evidence a defect in a judicial conclusion,
though based on the nicest legal reasoning and profoundest learning."

The late Mr. Justice Brewer, shortly before his death, in a
public address in New York City, also took the same view of the
matter. "The courts, their delays, and the cost of litigation," he
said, "are justly criticized, No judge ought to object to criticism,
and no honest judge will object."
. We readily recognize that there are limits beyond which no man
with a due sense of propriety will go in criticizing judicial action,
and it is a matter of history in which every American should feel
a sense of pride, that our judges, for the most part, have not been
subjected to intemperate and unfounded criticism. There has been a
commendable disposition to regard the judiciary in the light of what
Edmund Burke once said it should be, as "something exterior to the
state." But no judge has a right to absolute immunity from fairminded and reasonable criticism. The judge who spends his life in
construing rules of law and deciding fine points of procedure naturally tends to acquire habits of thought which lead him to attach
greater importance to procedural perfection and technical accuracy
than is sometimes consistent with the solid claims of justice. From
such a "thraldom" judges may sometimes be rescued by the help of
constructive criticism by intelligent laymen who are able to view the
questions at issue with minds less narrowed.
Such hair-splitting refinements as those sometines indulged in
by our judges in reaching their decisions tend to make the administration of justice ridiculous and excite the contempt rather than the
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respect of intelligent laymen and candid lawyers. If such opinions
were promptly criticized by disinterested persons, writes Mr. E. J.
McDermott, a prominent member of the Louisville bar, in a recent
number of The Docket, they would be rendered with less frequency.
Hon. Bourke Cockrait, in an address before the Ohio State Bar Association, July 8, 1908, dwelt upon the increasing lack of popular esteem in which many of our courts are beginning to be held because
of such decisions as those cited above. He said:
"The courts which since the establishment of our government
have been objects of universal respect and admiration have become
within the last few weeks objects of discussion and even criticism.
These criticisms are no longer cohfined to the reckless, the obscure,
the degraded, or the rejected of the people. They have been voiced
by many men in high positions, including among their number an official no less exalted than the President of the United States."
"Assuming, as I do," continued Mr. Cockran, "that no one desires or could contemplate with patience a proposal to abolish or
abandon our government as it exists, it follows that the most pressing necessity of our security is restoration .of the courts to the respect and confidence they enjoyed during the last century. How is
this to be accompfished? Manifestly, the way by which universal
respect amounting to reverence was originally acquired, is the surest
* 4, "
if not the only way by which it can be regained.
J. W. G.
REFORNM IN THE METHODS OF SELECTING JUIRIES.

The long delay involved in the selection of the jury in the second
trial of Lee ONeil Brown in Chicago recently,-some three weeks
were consumed, in the course of which 800 veniremen were summoned
by the court,-serves to call public attention again to the crying
need for more expeditious methods of selecting juries in important
cases. We have on another occasion referred to the Gilhooley and
Shea cases, in the former of which nine-and-a-half weeks were required to complete the panel, and in the latter, thirteen-and-a-half
weeks. In the Gilhooley case 4,150 veniremen were summhoned,
nearly 4,000,000 words being used in conducting the examination of
them. The cost in fees to veniremen and jurors amounted to
more than $1,000, mid their hotel expenses aggregated $2,,000 more.
In the first trial o Shea 9,425 veniremen were summ6ned; of whom
4,821 were actually:examined, ihe cost in jury fees alone amounting
to more than $18,000. In San Francisco recently 91 days were con. 531
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sumed in the selection of a jury to try Patrick Calhoun on the charge
of bribe'ry, and in the Cooper case in Tennessee several weeks were
similarly consumed.
Of course these are exceptional cases but the fact that such delays are possible under the present system ana that they are occurring with increasing frequency is evidence that something is wrong
with existing methods and that thorough-going reform is greatly
needed. Aside from the waste of time and expense, such delays tend
to increase the aversion to jury duty on the part of professional and
business men, thus rendering the task of selection more difficult.
It is not to be wondered at that a man who is confronted with
the prospect of being kept away from his home and business
in a virtual state of imprisonment for weeks, and possibly months,
before the trial is really started should, when asked if he knows any
reason why he cannot render an impartial verdict, resolve the doubt
in favor of his own comfort and liberty by professing a prejudice
which really does not exist in his mind.
The chief cause of such delays is the American practice which
assumes that one who may have hastily formed an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused from hearsay evidence or
from newspaper report is-incapable of rendering an impartial verdict
on the basis of the evidence brought out in the course of the trial.
Such a requirement practically disqualifies men of intelligence who
read the newspapers and who almost unconsciously form opinions
upon the merits of the case, especially when it is one which attracts
widespread attention in the community. It is, moreover, inconsistent
with one of the fundamental principles underlying the jury system,
namely, the ability of jurors to decide controverted facts on the basis
of the evidence presented in court. It is submitted that any juror
who is capable of doing this intelligently is capable of altering a
preconceived opinion when the evidence produced in court points to
a different conclusion from that which he may have reached on the
basis of hearsay evidence or newspaper report. The fact, therefore,
that a juror has formed an opinion from reading newspaper accounts
of the crime should not prima facie be a cause for challenge.
In our judgment it ought to be sufficient to ask a venireman two
questions only in order to determine his fitness for jury service: first,
whether he is in any way related to the accused or his victim; and
second, whether he knows of any reason why he cannot render a
,erdict in accordance with the evidence presented to the court. The
irrelevant, long-drawn-out interrogatories often resorted to by coun-
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sel are unnecessary and ought not to be permitted. In the Gilhooley
case referred to above, one juror was interrogated for an ho.ur-andthree-quarters in regard to his past life, his domestic, business and
social relationships and many other matters which were immaterial.
Another juror was asked seventy-three questions by counsel for defense and almost as many by the prosecuting attorney. In the Iroquois theater fire case, jurors were asked whether they were opposed
to dancing, whether they were fond of music, whether they believed in
theater-going, whether they had any prejudices against city people,
whether any of their families were ever hurt in a fire, what newspapers they were accustomed to read, and many other questions of
a similar character.
According to the English practice, the requirement of due
process of law in the selection of jurors is fully satisfied by the
two inquiries mentioned above and the protracted rambling interrogatories which have come to be a regular feature of nearly
every important trial in this country are not permitted. To an
Englishman it seems superfluous and a waste of time to ask a juror
anything more than whether he is related to either of the parties,
and if not, whether he can return a verdict in accordance with the
law and the evidence. The result is that rarely more than an hour is
ever consumed by an English court in completing a panel in the most
difficult case. R. Newton Crane, formerly a member of the American
bar, but for some years past a prominent barrister of London, in a
letter to Hon. Joseph H. Choate, dated March 1, 190, speaking of
the English procedure of empanelling juries, said: "The examination of jurors on their voir dire is absolutely unknown in England,
while many lawyers who have been in practice for twenty years or
more have never known a juror to be objected to or excused for
cause. It not infrequently happens that the same twelve jurymen
will hear three cases without leaving the box." (See report of the
New York Commission on the Law's Delay, p. 111.) The truth of this
statement has recently been confirmed by Dean Lawson of Missouri,
who spent four months in England during the past summer studying English procedure. In an address before the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology at its recent meeting in
Washington, Mr. Lawson declared that it requires no longer to
select a jury in England than is necessary to call their names, and
that the challenge of a juror is as rare as the challenge of a judge
in the United States. He says he never saw a juror challenged
during the four months he spent in the English courts, and he was
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informed by one of the judges that only one instance of a challenge
had come under his observation during a period of fourteen years.
Mr. Lawson says the same jury. will frequently hear three cases
before leaving the box, one such case having come under his observation while attending a court in Manchester.
It is not allowable to ask a prospective juror whether he has
formed an opinion or has expressed one, for it is not assumed that one
who has expressed an opinion on the facts as heard from others, or
read in the newspapers, is thereby biased. The burden of proof to
show the existence of prejudice is on him who challenges a juror,
and evidence of bias must be produced to support a challenge.
Neither counsel for the Crown nor the defense is permitted,
says Mr. Lawson, to go on a fishing expedition in the course of the
examination in the hope of finding some possible ground foir a challenge.
"Think of taking a month or six weeks to select a jury," says
Justice Henry B. Brown (retired) of the United States Supreme
Court, "and requiring each prospective juror to give a history of
his life and his opinion upon every conceivable subject for the ap-.
parent purpose of laying the ground, not for a challenge for cause,
but for a peremptory challenge. 'When I was a Judge in the court
of original jurisdiction," says Justice Brown, "in all the fifteen
years time I do not think I spent more than two or three hours in
impanelling a jury."
Hon. Frank B. Kellog, special assistant to the Attorney General
of the United States, in discussing the "delays of the law" has this
Lo say of our methods of choosing juries:
"The trouble is that in the selection of juries we have come to
impose such technical rules as to opinions obtained from hearsay or
from press reports that it is almost impossible in the trial of a case
of great public interest to obtain a high-minded and intelligent jury.
I do not minimize the importance of obtaining an impartial jury,
It is, of course, necessary in all trials; but the energies of legislators,
lawyers, and judges have for so many years been exercised in throwing safeguards around their selection that these safeguards have
become obstacles in the accomplishment of the real purpose.
"I believe that the court should restrict the prolonged and
technical examination of jurors, interposing its authority to see that
only a.i'easonable examination takes place, and that the court itself
should very largely conduct the examination. I do not say that in
all cases the lawyers should be prohibited from examining jurors.
534
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They should be permitted t6 examine when that may tend to elicit
information which would show the disqualification of a juror. But
the license which has been exercised by the bar should be prevented
and the right largely restricted. In many cases the judge himself
is best qualified to perform the duty, though, to be sure, he- can be
largely aided by counsel by reason of their knowledge of the case."
In our judgment the selection of juries could be materially expedited without impairing the value of the jury system by abolishing the rule which practically disqualifies a juror who has formed
or casually expressed an opinion on the question at issue, unless the
opinion is founded on manifest prejudice or is so strongly fixed that
there is no reason to believe that it could be changed by the evidence;
by confining the examination to simple inquiries as to whether the
juror is related to either of the parties and whether he knows of any
reason why he cannot return a verdict in accordance with the evidence introduced and admitted; by making the decision of the trial
judge final upon objections asked of prospective jurors by either
the counsel for the defense or the prosecuting attorney; by materially reducing the number of peremptory challenges now usually allowed; by providing more adequate and homelike accommodations for
the physical comfort of jurors,thereby lessening the tendency to shirk
jury duty by men who are accustomed to the comforts of home life;
and by removing some of the petty and unreasonable restrictions on
their liberty, particularly those which are inconsistent with the idea
that jury service is a dignilfed and honorable public duty. The
selection of a better class of men would also be facilitated by the
abolition of the wholesale exemptions now allowed to many professional classes, the result of which is to eliminate a large proportion
of the best qualified citizens and to restrict jury duty, to ,a.large
extent, to less fit classes.
J.W.G.

